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Abstract—Preventing vulnerability exploits is a critical soft-
ware maintenance task, and software engineers often rely on
Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVEs) reports for infor-
mation about vulnerable systems and libraries. These reports
include descriptions, disclosure sources, and manually-populated
vulnerability characteristics such as root cause from the NIST
Vulnerability Description Ontology (VDO). This information
needs to be complete and accurate so stakeholders of affected
products can prevent and react to exploits of the reported
vulnerabilities. However, characterizing each report requires
significant time and expertise which can lead to inaccurate or
incomplete reports. This directly impacts stakeholders ability to
quickly and correctly maintain their affected systems.
In this study, we demonstrate that VDO characteristics can be
automatically detected from the textual descriptions included in
CVE reports. We evaluated the performance of 6 classification
algorithms with a dataset of 365 vulnerability descriptions, each
mapped to 1 of 19 characteristics from the VDO. This work
demonstrates that it is feasible to train classification techniques
to accurately characterize vulnerabilities from their descriptions.
All 6 classifiers evaluated produced accurate results, and the Sup-
port Vector Machine classifier was the best-performing individual
classifier. Automating the vulnerability characterization process
is a step towards ensuring stakeholders have the necessary data
to effectively maintain their systems.
Index Terms—software maintenance, vulnerability characteri-
zation, text classification, CVE, VDO
I. INTRODUCTION
Preventing exploits of existing and emergent vulnerabilities
is a critical software maintenance task. Whenever a new vul-
nerability or exploit affecting a software product is discovered,
the software must be updated to remove the vulnerability
and/or add appropriate mitigation technique. Stakeholders of
a software product must have access to comprehensive and
accurate data about vulnerabilities affecting their system to
perform this maintenance. The standardized source for vulner-
ability data are Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE)
reports, stored in the online and publicly available National
Vulnerability Database [2] maintained by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST). Listing 1 is an example
of a vulnerability description from a NIST CSV report.
CVE ID: CVE-2017-6725
Overview: A vulnerability in the web framework code of Cisco Prime Infras-
tructure could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a cross-site
scripting (XSS) attack against a user of the web interface of an affected system.
More Information: CSCuw65833 CSCuw65837. Known Affected Releases: 2.2(2).
References: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/99202, [...]
Listing 1. Vulnerability Description from the NVD
Characterizing software vulnerabilities is a critical step in
identifying the root cause of the vulnerability, understanding
its consequences, attack mechanisms and appropriate mitiga-
tion techniques. A vulnerability characterization is an impor-
tant property for making informed decisions to fix or mitigate
the vulnerability. NIST has developed a standardized Vulnera-
bility Description Ontology (VDO) [1] to characterize software
vulnerabilities. The VDO defines the description attributes
required to effectively provided actionable intelligence to the
software developers aiming to fix/mitigate the vulnerability.
Figure 1 demonstrates various attributes of VDO ontology
used to characterize software vulnerabilities. For example,
the Impact Method characterization category represents how
a vulnerability can be exploited. The characterizations in
the category reflect specific techniques an attacker can use
to take advantage of a vulnerability: Authentication Bypass,
Trust Failure, Context Escape, Man-in-the-Middle Attack, and
Code Execution. Other characterizations specify consequences,
domain, location, and mitigations for vulnerability exploits.
Stakeholders and affected users of the vulnerable product
rely on characteristic data to determine how an exploit affects
their systems and how to prevent exploitation. Unfortunately,
identifying a vulnerability’s characteristics as described in
the VDO is a manual, labor-intensive, and asynchronous
process. Proper characterization of a vulnerability requires
reviewing its descriptions with sufficient security background
and familiarity with the ontology. This intensive process has
lead to problems with the quality of the vulnerability reports.
Studies have found that NVD’s vulnerability reports are often
left incomplete or lack specific characteristics [10], [13].
In this study, we conducted an experiment in which we
used information retrieval, natural language processing, and
supervised machine learning techniques to characterize vul-
nerabilities based on the descriptions present in every CVE
report. We manually curated a dataset of 365 vulnerability
descriptions, each mapped to 1 of 19 characteristics from
the NIST Vulnerability Description Ontology (VDO). This
data was run through several stratified 10-fold cross valida-
tion experiments to train and evaluate the performance of 6
classification algorithms to determine which was most suited
for the task. We initially found that the classifier with the
best performance was a Majority Vote ensemble learner, which
assigned the majority-chosen label from 1 instance each of the
Naı¨ve Bayes, Decision Tree, Support Vector Machine (SVM),
AdaBoost-SVM, and Random Forest classifiers. However,
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Fig. 1. The NIST Vulnerability Description Ontology (VDO)
further statistical tests showed that it was not significantly
better than an individual Support Vector Machine classifier,
which requires less resources to train.
We conclude from our findings that it is feasible to rely only
on vulnerability description to characterize the CVE attributes.
This automated approach can provide valuable information
to the software developers so they can better understand a
reported vulnerability and its characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Our
data collection and experiment methodology are explained in
Section II. The results of our experiment are reported and
discussed in Section III. We acknowledge related work in
Section IV, and we conclude in Section V.
II. AUTOMATED CHARACTERIZATION OF VULNERABILITY
REPORTS
Towards the goal of automating the vulnerability character-
ization process, we developed an approach that applies natural
language processing (NLP), information retrieval (IR), and
supervised machine learning techniques to train a classifier to
analyze CVE reports and automatically infer their VDO char-
acteristics. This is based on an assumption that the terms used
in CVE descriptions offer insights into these characteristics of
the vulnerability, and classifiers can learn such insight based
on historical data. To test the feasibility of this approach, we
trained multiple classification algorithms and compared their
performance to determine the best performing classifier for
this specific task.
In this section we describe our evaluation approach. First,
we created a labeled dataset by manually curating relevant
vulnerability descriptions for each of the 19 characteristics
Next, 6 classifiers were trained and tested using stratified 10-
fold cross validation. The results were used to calculate a set of
evaluation metrics, which were used to compare the classifiers’
performance as reported in Section III.
A. Labeled Dataset Creation
Using textual descriptions to characterize vulnerability re-
ports is considered a multi-class text classification task [15]. In
binary and multi-class classification, each item in the training
dataset is manually assigned 1 class (label). Therefore, our
first task was to curate a set of vulnerability descriptions for
each of the 19 characteristics.
We peer-reviewed numerous CVEs and their vulnerability
descriptions in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [2]
and selected CVE reports that had previously been charac-
terized by the original developers. These CVE reports and
their instantiated characteristics were peer reviewed by two
security experts from our research group. Descriptions were
only kept if the two members of our team agreed with
the labeling performed by the original developer. The end
result was a manually curated training dataset of 365 labeled
descriptions. The number of CVE descriptions mapped to each
VDO attribute ranged from 12 to 26, and the median was
19. To mitigate the risks associated with imbalanced data,
Proper precautions were taken to ensure that the evaluations
handled this situation appropriately (see Section II-D below).
Figure 2 shows the distribution of descriptions across the
characteristics.
Fig. 2. Distribution of Vuln. Descriptions per Characteristic
B. Training Data Preparation
Before the training data can be provided as input to the
classification algorithms, it must be pre-processed. This is
a necessary step in the natural language processing (NLP)
data pipeline which cleans the text data and converts it to
a numerical representation for use in classic machine learning
algorithms. The vulnerability descriptions mined from the
NVD’s online vulnerability reports are considered “free text”,
meaning there were limited restrictions on what characters
were permitted. This means it can be “dirty” and contain
non-textual characters which will affect the quality of the
classifications if left in the input data.
To prepare our text data for classification, we cleaned each
vulnerability description. First, all characters were converted to
lowercase and urls were removed. Next, the text was tokenized
by splitting sentences in the text by spaces into individual
words. The set of tokens were then filtered to remove any
non-word tokens (eg.!,#,?). We also removed stop words (eg.
“the”,“a”). Next, each word in a vulnerability description was
stemmed to its root. Then the text data was converted to a
numerical representation known as a Term Frequency-Inverse
Document Frequency (TF-IDF) Matrix. Each row in the matrix
is a vulnerability description, and each pre-processed word in
the entire dataset is a column. Therefore, the TF-IDF weights
in the matrix are calculated per-description for every word.
These values are proportions of how often the word occurs
within the description and how many descriptions it occurs
in. This matrix is then provided as input to each classification
algorithm. For our work, we used the StringToWordVec filter
in the Weka tool [7] to perform all these operations.
C. Classification
We compared the performance of 6 classification algo-
rithms, using implementations from the Weka data mining
tool. We ran preliminary experiments of all algorithms avail-
able in the tool and empirically selected 3 “individual” clas-
sifiers (Naı¨ve Bayes, Decision Tree, Support Vector Machine)
and 3 “ensemble” classifiers (Random Forest, AdaBoost-SVM,
Majority Vote).
D. Stratified 10-Fold Cross-Validation
Cross validation is a standard technique for training a
classifier and evaluate its performance for unseen data. To
mitigate risks related to imbalanced data [5], we applied
stratified 10-fold cross validation which splits the labeled data
into 10 sets, representing each class proportionally in each set.
To tune the hyper-parameters for each of the 6 classifiers, we
ran the 10-fold experiments using multiple configurations. The
best performing configurations were used in our evaluation.
These configurations are provided in Table I in the Weka [7]
“scheme” format used to run the experiments.
III. RESULTS
After the stratified 10-fold cross validation was conducted
for all classifiers, we calculated 6 standard evaluation metrics
from Weka’s output to compare their performance.
The baseline metrics for each classifier are shown in Ta-
ble II. The Majority Vote ensemble classifier had the highest
accuracy, or total percentage of correctly classified data, at
74.52%. Majority Vote also had the highest Kappa statistic
of 0.73. SVM and AdaBoost-SVM tied for 2nd best accuracy
(72.88%) and Kappa (0.71).
Per-characteristic information retrieval metrics (precision,
recall, and F-measure) were computed for each of the 6
classifiers as shown in Table III. The best F-measure for each
characteristic is highlighted (ties are all counted as best) and
the number of highlights per classifier was used to calculate
what we call the Ratio of Best Performance (RBF) for each
classifier. This a ratio of the number of characteristics that
the classifier “won” (highest F1) to the total number of
characteristics evaluated (19). Using this metric, the Majority
Voting ensemble was the best performing classifier, for 8 of
the characteristics (RBF = 0.42).
A. Analysis of Results
The baseline metrics in Table II indicate that all classifiers
had an accuracy higher than 50%, and outperformed random
assignment. While these metrics can be used to measure
the performance of each classifier individually, they are not
suitable for comparing classifiers. However, these findings
indicate that text classification algorithms are well-suited for
the task of automatically characterize vulnerability reports
using their description.
The best performance metrics in Table III were used in-
stead to compare classifiers, and these results show that each
classification algorithm performed best for at least 3 of the
characteristic classes. The worst performing classifiers in this
respect were Naı¨ve Bayes and Random Forest, each with
RBF = 0.16. The individual Support Vector Machine (SVM)
and the ensemble AdaBoost-SVM had identical F-measures,
tying for second-best classifier by performing best for 7 of
19 classes. These 2 classifiers also had the same accuracy
and kappa statistic, which indicates that applying Adaptive
Boosting did not improve the SVM classifier at all.
To confirm our RBP-based findings, we also conducted
statistical significance tests. First, we conducted a Friedman
test [15] which confirmed a statistically significant (p < 0.05)
performance difference between any of the classifiers, as
shown in Table IV. We also performed a post-hoc Conover
test [3] to investigate if differences in performance between
individual classifiers was statistically significant. The p-values
from this analysis are listed in Table V. This data indicates that
the SVM classifier’s performance was significantly (P < 0.05)
different from the Random Forest and Decision tree classifiers
but not the Majority Vote or AdaBoost-SVM.
The statistical tests confirm that while the Majority Vote
classifier had the highest accuracy and Ratio of Best Per-
formance, it did not significantly outperform the individual
Support Vector Machine (SVM). Therefore, there is no moti-
vation to spend more resources training the ensemble Majority
Vote and instead a Support Vector Machine is suited for this
classification task.
Classifier Evaluation Key Findings:
• Classification learners can be trained to accurately
characterize vulnerability reports using their free-text
descriptions.
• The classifier with the highest accuracy and Ratio
of Best Performance in our evaluation was the Ma-
jority Vote ensemble learner, with a Ratio of Best
Performance of 0.42 (performing best for 8 of 19
characteristics) and overall accuracy of 74.52%.
• The Support Vector Machine (SVM) and AdaBoost-
SVM classifiers tied for 2nd-best with a Ratio of
Best Performance of 0.37.
• Majority Vote did not significantly outperform these
classifiers, and the AdaBoost-SVM ensemble did
not significantly outperform the individual Support
Vector Machine.
• Considering these evaluations and time-to-train,an
individual Support Vector Machine is concluded
to be the best-performing classifier for this task.
IV. RELATED WORK
A. Analysis of Vulnerability Report Data
Several studies have evaluated the quality of vulnerability
reports which motivated our work to improve them. An early
and extensive study by Ozment [13] noted the inconsistent
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHM HYPER-PARAMETER CONFIGURATION SCHEMES USED IN WEKA TOOL
Classifier Weka Schema (Hyper-parameters)
Random Forest weka.classifiers.trees.RandomForest,-P 100 -O -I 320 -num-slots 1 -K 1 -M 1.0 -V 0.001 -S 123 -B
Decision Tree weka.classifiers.trees.J48 -C 0.4 -M 0
SVM weka.classifiers.functions.SMO -C 0.5 -L 0.001 -P 1.0E-12 -N 0 -V 10 -W 123 -K
“weka.classifiers.functions.supportVector.PolyKernel -E 1.0 -C 250007” -calibrator “weka.classifiers.functions.Logistic
-R 1.0E-8 -M -1 -num-decimal-places 4”
AdaBoost-SVM weka.classifiers.meta.AdaBoostM1,-P 100 -S 123 -I 100 -W weka.classifiers.functions.SMO – -C 0.5 -L 0.001 -
P,1.0E-12 -N 0 -V 10 -W 123 -K,“weka.classifiers.functions.supportVector.PolyKernel -E 1.0 -C,250007” -calibrator
“weka.classifiers.functions.Logistic -R 1.0E-8,-M -1 -num-decimal-places 4”
MajorityVote weka.classifiers.meta.Vote,-S 123 -B “weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes ” -B,“weka.classifiers.functions.SMO -C 0.5
-L 0.001 -P 1.0E-12 -N 0 -V 10 -W,123 -K \“weka.classifiers.functions.supportVector.PolyKernel -E 1.0 -C,250007\” -
calibrator \“weka.classifiers.functions.Logistic -R,1.0E-8 -M -1 -num-decimal-places 4\”” -B,“weka.classifiers.trees.J48
-C 0.4 -M 0” -B,“weka.classifiers.trees.RandomForest -P 100 -O -I 320 -num-slots 1 -K 1,-M 1.0 -V 0.001 -S 123”
-B “weka.classifiers.meta.AdaBoostM1 -P 100,-S 123 -I 100 -W weka.classifiers.functions.SMO – -C 0.5 -L 0.001 -P
1.0E-12,-N 0 -V -1 -W 123 -K,\“weka.classifiers.functions.supportVector.PolyKernel -E 1.0 -C,250007\” -calibrator
\“weka.classifiers.functions.Logistic -R,1.0E-8 -M -1 -num-decimal-places 4\”” -R MAJ
TABLE II
BASELINE METRICS FOR CLASSIFIERS
Classifier Accuracy Kappa statistic
Nave Bayes 66.85% 0.65
Decision Tree 64.93% 0.63
SMO-SVM 72.88% 0.71
Random Forest 71.51% 0.70
AdaBoost-SVM 72.88% 0.71
Majority Vote 74.52% 0.73
terminology used at the time for characterizing vulnerabilities
and also highlighted the inconsistent report quality. Mas-
sacci and Nguyen [10] compared characterizations included
in reports from 14 vulnerability databases, maintained by
specific and multi-software vendors (eg. Bugzilla and NVD).
They corroborated the earlier findings, noting NVD lacked
or had incomplete data for many temporal and code-related
characterizations. Ladd [9] compared the report generation
processes of the NVD and its Chinese equivalent the CNNVD,
concluding that the asynchronous reporting processes of the
NVD cause the US falls behind on vulnerability management.
B. Characterizing Vulnerabilities
Other relevant works aimed to develop or identify of vulner-
ability characterizations, but do not use the NIST Vulnerability
Description Ontology, which was published in late 2016 [1].
Tierney [16] used similar data mining and machine learning
techniques and CVE report data, including a precursor of
NIST’s CVSS severity scores [11], to learn vulnerability
patterns and co-ocurring vulnerabilities, and to classify vul-
nerabilities by severity. Zhang et al. [17] extracted temporal,
affected version, and severity score data from CVE reports
and evaluated 6 regression and classification algorithms on the
task of predicting a system’s time to next vulnerability with
limited success, which they attributed to the poor quality of
the NVD data. Edkrantz and Said [4] extracted n-grams from
CVE report summaries along with other CVE data such as the
severity score to evaluate the performance of 5 classification
algorithms on the task of predicting the likelihood that a
vulnerability would be exploited. SVM classifiers also per-
formed best for their task. Santos et. al [14] curated a catalog
of architectural weaknesses leveraging root cause data from
vulnerability reports. Gonzalez et. al [6] also analyzed root
cause data from vulnerability reports to identify weaknesses
common in the domain of Industrial Control Systems.
Most similar to our work is that of Joshi et al. [8], who
also characterized vulnerabilities using the textual descriptions
from the CVE reports. While this work shares our goal,
the approaches are very different. Instead of classifiers, they
trained a custom version of Stanford CoreNLP’s Named En-
tity Recognition implementation to identify and distinguish
specific people, places, and things. They defined 10 character-
ization classes based on existing security literature, and also
used terminology from a different ontology [12].
V. CONCLUSIONS & NEXT STEPS
This study was motivated by the existing challenges is
maintaining vulnerability reports. We evaluated an approach
towards automating the process of identifying characteris-
tics for vulnerabilities using their descriptions. We curated
365 vulnerability descriptions from the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD), each mapped to 1 of 19 characteristics from
the NIST Vulnerability Description Ontology. We used this
data train and evaluate the performance of 6 classification
algorithms using stratified 10-fold cross validation. Standard
information retrieval and machine learning metrics were used
to identify the classification algorithm which performed best.
We found that all of the classifiers were able to accu-
rately identify relevant vulnerability characteristics from the
NIST Vulnerability Description Ontology (VDO). The best
performing classifier for this task based on accuracy and the
Ratio of Best Performance metric was a Majority Vote en-
semble learner, which assigns the majority-chosen label from
1 instance each of the Naı¨ve Bayes, Decision Tree, Support
Vector Machine (SVM), AdaBoost-SVM, and Random Forest
classifiers. However, further statistical tests showed that it
TABLE III
PER-CHARACTERISTIC RESULTS OF STRATIFIED 10-FOLD CROSS VALIDATION
Individual Classifiers Ensemble Classifiers
Naı¨ve Bayes Decision Trees SVM Random Forest AdaBoost-SVM Majority Vote
characteristic Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1
ASLR 1.00 0.80 0.89 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.86 1.00 0.80 0.89 1.00 0.75 0.86 1.00 0.85 0.92
Context Escape 0.76 0.96 0.85 0.77 0.65 0.71 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.77 1.00 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.92 0.87
File System 0.83 0.42 0.56 0.30 0.25 0.27 0.80 0.33 0.47 0.43 0.25 0.32 0.80 0.33 0.47 0.80 0.33 0.47
HPHK 0.64 0.75 0.69 0.88 0.58 0.70 0.89 0.67 0.76 0.89 0.67 0.76 0.89 0.67 0.76 0.90 0.75 0.82
HSTS 0.80 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.86 0.81 0.59 0.77 0.67 0.56 0.86 0.68 0.59 0.77 0.67 0.66 0.86 0.75
Indirect Disclosure 0.69 0.92 0.79 1.00 0.63 0.77 0.96 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.96 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.89
Limited 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.29 0.32 0.55 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.29 0.36 0.55 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.43 0.48
Man-in-the-Middle 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.93 0.82 0.88 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.77 0.79
Memory 0.56 0.41 0.47 0.58 0.68 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.48 0.55 0.51 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
Multi-Factor Auth 0.69 0.64 0.67 1.00 0.79 0.88 0.91 0.71 0.80 0.82 0.64 0.72 0.91 0.71 0.80 0.91 0.71 0.80
Network Traffic 0.53 0.63 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.89 0.50 0.64 0.88 0.44 0.58 0.89 0.50 0.64 0.89 0.50 0.64
Physical Security 0.71 0.56 0.63 0.82 0.78 0.80 0.94 0.83 0.88 1.00 0.67 0.80 0.94 0.83 0.88 0.94 0.83 0.88
Privilege Escalation 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.95 0.83 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.84 0.95 0.83 0.88 0.95 0.83 0.88
Read 0.77 0.71 0.74 0.47 0.63 0.54 0.64 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.75 0.69 0.62 0.75 0.68 0.69 0.75 0.72
Sandboxed 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.88 0.79 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.74 0.78 0.83 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.79
Service Interrupt 0.68 0.77 0.72 0.93 0.82 0.88 0.94 0.88 0.91 0.76 0.94 0.84 0.94 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.94 0.91
Trust Failure 0.57 0.77 0.66 0.33 0.62 0.43 0.74 0.89 0.81 0.76 0.85 0.80 0.74 0.89 0.81 0.70 0.89 0.78
Unlimited 0.71 0.55 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.52 0.77 0.62 0.64 0.73 0.68 0.52 0.77 0.62 0.57 0.73 0.64
Write 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.23 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.35 0.28 0.22 0.29 0.25
RBF: 0.16 RBF: 0.21 RBF: 0.37 RBF: 0.16 RBF: 0.37 RBF: 0.42
TABLE IV
TESTING FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASSIFIER PERFORMANCE
# of Classes 19
Friedman’s Chi-Squared 19.38312
df 5
p-value 0.002
TABLE V
P-VALUES FROM CONOVER POST-HOC TEST
Decision Tree SVM Random Forest Adaboost-SVM
SVM 0.000033072 NA NA NA
Random Forest 0.552778600 0.02808133 NA NA
Adaboost-SVM 0.000033072 1.00 0.02808133 NA
Majority Vote 0.000000002 0.18663475 0.00000546 0.1866348
was not significantly better than an individual Support Vector
Machine classifier, which requires less resources to train. This
is an encouraging finding towards measuring the suitability of
automated text classification algorithms for this task. With a
learner that does not require extensive resources to train and
test, vulnerability data can be easily updated and expanded.
With this work, we have demonstrated that the vulnerability
management process can be improved with this approach
thereby providing actionable information to programmers to
effectively perform software engineering tasks. Future research
will focus on expanding our dataset to include more descrip-
tions and support the remaining characteristics, and conducting
further classifier evaluations to increase the accuracy and scope
of the automated approach. We also aim to utilize the CVE
characteristics to generate intelligence about each vulnerability
and consequently recommend appropriate mitigation strategies
to software maintainers.
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